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Abstract 
Systemic economic transition is a process of determined radical institutional change, a 
process of building new institutions required by a market economy. Nowadays, the ex-
perience of transition countries with the implementation of new institutions could be re-
viewed as a method of economic development that despite similar singular steps has dif-
ferent  effects  on  the  domestic  economic  performance.  The  process  of  institutional 
change towards a market economy is determined by political will, thus the government 
plays an important role in carrying out the economic reforms. Among the variety of out-
comes and effects the attention is drawn especially to economic growth that diverges 
significantly in different post-transition countries. The paper attempts to shed light upon 
the problem on the basis of institutional economics, of economics of innovation and par-
tially of political economy of growth using an evolutionary, process-oriented perspec-
tive. In this context the issue central to the promotion of economic growth is the suc-
cessful implementation of new institutions through governmental activities. The paper 
shows that under the conditions of bounded rationality and radical uncertainty economic 
growth is determined, inter alia, by the capacity for governmental learning. 
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I TRODUCTIO  
In the recent economic literature, two different issues have been actively discussed: the 
relationship  between  governance  and  economic  growth,  on  one  hand,  and  a  more 
process-oriented  view  on  the  impact  of  governmental  learning  on  economic  perfor-
mance, on the other hand. The second issue has already been investigated for developed 
countries  in  a  case  study  of  Dutch  technology  policy  (GROENEWEGEN,  STEEN 
2007).  However,  this  issue  is  particularly  intriguing  regarding  its  application  to  the 
problems of economic transition, and more generally to development economics. Eco-
nomic  transition  is  a  radical  form  of  institutional  change  with  multiple  and parallel 
change processes in all spheres of social and economic life. The political actors, respon-
sible for setting up the  effective future framework for  economic  activities, are con-
strained to decide under conditions of extreme complexity, bounded rationality (SIMON 
1957) and radical uncertainty (KNIGHT 1921). The capacity for governmental learning 
becomes one of the determinants of economic performance. 
 
The main focus of this paper is the radical deliberate institutional change such as eco-
nomic transition and the role of governmental learning in the promotion of economic 
growth by setting up the institutional framework for economic activities. First, the paper 
explains what the institutions are and they change. Then, the paper gives an overview of 
the significance of institutions for economic growth admitted to them by different theo-
retical approaches. Any radical deliberate institutional change carries the problem of 
possible inconsistency between institutional innovations and the given institutional en-
vironment, which can impede economic performance. To avoid or to resolve this prob-
lem, the capacity for effective governmental learning becomes a crucial issue. Based on 
historical evidence of the economic transition in China and Russia, the paper compares 
proceedings for implementing institutions and conducting economic reforms in Russia 
and China in the first years of transition and identifies governmental learning as one of 
the factors that determines high economic growth during the transition and the devel-
opment process. 
I STITUTIO S A D I STITUTIO AL CHA GE: A BRIEF SURVEY 
In economics the term institution could be used to define a rule of the game, habitual 
behavior or an organization. In the following the term is used in its broad sense. Hence, 
institutions are sets of rules that reduce uncertainty by restricting and canalizing the be-
havior of economic actors “or, more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that 
shape human interaction” (NORTH 1990: 3). Further institutions can be distinguished 
as formal (law, regulations) or informal (social norms, traditions, habits), and institu-
tional arrangements (contracts between economic agents) (DAVIS, NORTH 1971: 5-6). 
All of them are the result of “shared mental models,” and together they create the insti-
tutional environment in which economic activities are conducted. 
 
The institutional environment is not exogenously defined and unchangeable. It has a so-
cial nature so the environment changes, sometimes slowly or, under certain conditions, 
very quickly (revolution). As mentioned above, the aim of institutions is the reduction 
of uncertainty that arises by planning and conducting economic activities. A frequent or 




nomic (and political) actors, so that institutions need to show a grade of stability and 
persistence. A certain resistance to change is, therefore, characteristic of the institutional 
environment. Nevertheless, institutional change is an inherent part of social develop-
ment. 
 
In its progress institutional change can follow as a consequence of social evolution or 
technological change or occur deliberately due to the strategic decisions of policymak-
ers. Radical changes in the institutional environment such as economic transitions are 
imposed by political decisions. Thus, political actors play a crucial role in designing, 
implementing, adapting and enforcing new institutions which are institutional innova-
tions to the existing institutional environment. However, political actors, as all humans, 
possess limited cognitive capacity and are not omniscient. Given the fact of dispersed 
knowledge as well as individual cognitive and procedural limitation by handling of in-
formation, political decisions are made under radical uncertainty1 and bounded rational-
ity2. Thus, their consequences can only be judged ex post. The standard Hayekian dis-
covery process becomes a part of institutional change: by trying out the viability of dif-
ferent institutional innovations whose effects cannot be judged in advance, political ac-
tors create/acquire knowledge by the method of trial and error and influence the perfor-
mance of the economic system (HAYEK 1945). Hence, governmental learning plays an 
important role in the analysis of institutional change. 
 
Before focusing on governmental learning as a determinant of economic growth, the 
paper draws upon existing theoretical approaches to explain how institutions are con-
nected to economic performance. 
THE IMPACT OF I STITUTIO S O  GROWTH I  ECO OMIC THEORY 
The core attempt of economic analysis was and remains the search for solutions to the 
problem of resources scarcity that promote economic growth and, hence, enhance wel-
fare. Nowadays, there is a consensus among economists that “institutions matter”. How-
ever, the role of institutions, however, differs significantly in economic analysis. Mod-
ern mainstream theoretical approaches accept the importance of a certain set of institu-
tions that enable and support the functionality of free markets and thus contribute to a 
better  economic  performance.  Recently,  institutionalists’  views,  old  and  new,  have 
gained in importance in economic debates. Here is a short overview of the different 
theoretical considerations regarding institutions and economic growth as well as conclu-
sions for the transition process as a radical institutional change. 
                                                 
1  Radical uncertainty in Knightian sense of the word means the case where the probability is incalcul-
able. This is the case when one is relying on many other actors with private knowledge and private 
motives. A single subjective probability has a very small degree of being correct in any individual 
case as one possesses only the general knowledge of possible motives and their outcomes. Multiplied 
by millions of participants the probability becomes uselessly small.  orth points out that uncertainty 
“has been the underlying condition responsible for the evolving structure of human organization 
throughout history and pre-history” (2005: 14). 
2  Bounded rationality is the term which has been introduced to economic science by Simon (1957) in 
his work Model of Man. There he states that "boundedly rational agents experience limits in formu-
lating and solving complex problems and in processing (receiving, storing, retrieving, transmitting) 





The traditional mainstream economic literature is based on neoclassical economics and 
focuses on the calculation of the equilibrium. This approach assumes the existence of a 
certain efficient institutional structure including formal and informal institutions as well 
as institutional arrangements. The structure built the framework for market activities di-
rected toward efficient allocation and are not further considered in the economic analy-
sis.  Thus,  the  standard  neoclassical  theory  based  approaches  to  economic  transition 
proposed a radical change (Big Bang) through the fast establishment of an indicated set 
of new rules and counts on the market forces in the further development of the market 
economy. 
 
Over the past few decades, the comparative experience with the progress of transition 
and with its different impact on economic growth in the former centrally planned econ-
omies  revealed  the  shortages  of  the  standard  neoclassical  growth  models  with  one-
institutional-setting-fits-all approach (RODRIK 2010). Hence, the institutional string of 
economics, e.g. Austrian school, Old Institutional economics (OIE), that evolved in the 
first half of the 20
th century have lead to more consequent consideration of institutions 
in mainstream economics. The Austrian school (ordoliberalism) places the main theo-
retical focus on the necessity of basic principles to implement an economic order. The 
ordoliberal demands the rule of law and considers not only isolated laws but also the in-
teraction of these elements in the system of laws and their conformity to the institutional 
framework. The core of old institutional economics builds instead a concept of human 
economic behavior that shapes and explains institutions. According to OIE’s concept, 
institutions are not necessarily created to be socially and economically efficient but to 
serve and to preserve the interests of some social groups and to create new rules. Then, 
imitation and emulation of behaviors lead to the reinforcement of institutional innova-
tions and help to standardize behaviors. Institutions, in that way, summarize individual 
actions to a collective action. These collective actions are regulated and controlled by 
governmental activities, laws, social customs, organizations and individual behavior in 
terms of bargaining, negotiating, transacting, etc. The capacity for collective action and 
the quality of institutional environment determine the overall economic performance. 
 
In the recent times,  ew Institutional Economics ( IE) – still based on neoclassical 
theory – has increasingly used the instruments of traditional economic analysis to fur-
ther improve the quality of institutions as they become more important for economic 
performance. Some representatives such as Libecap claim that “the new institutional 
economics retains its general attachment to neoclassical economics with its emphasis on 
individual maximization and marginal analysis, but with attention to transaction costs, 
information problems, and bounded rationality” (LIBECAP 1998).  orth introduces the 
concept of transaction costs to institutional economics and considers institutions that 
minimize transaction costs efficient. To him, the most important role of institutions is 
that of reducing uncertainty in order to determine a steady framework of economic ac-
tivities. Nevertheless,  orth is close to Old institutionalism in his theoretical approach 
as he states that institutions should not be necessarily efficient—“[i]nstitutions are not 
necessarily or even usually created to be socially efficient; rather they, or at least the 
formal rules, are created to serve the interests of those with bargaining power to devise 
new rules” (NORTH 1990: 16). He also highlights the vital role of power clusters and 




of institutional change (Public Choice) and, on the other hand, increase or decrease the 
institutional efficiency. 
 
Building a bridge between Old and  ew Institutional Economics,  orth states that im-
perfect  information,  bounded  rationality  and  different  types  of  market  asymmetries 
cause a rise in transaction costs. The purpose of institutions in this imperfect economic 
world is to reduce uncertainty and give more stability to economic relations. Transac-
tion costs can make up a big part of the total cost of production and derive from ex-
changing, protecting and enforcing property rights as well as acquiring information. As 
in neoclassical theory, institutions can be set up in a short period of time; however, the 
extent of the transaction costs would determine institution’s and thus domestic econom-
ic efficiency. 
 
Hence, in the more recent mainstream economic literature, institutions have moved to 
the core of the debate regarding economic growth (RODRIK 2000). Rodrik pointed out 
that,  despite  some  diversity  among  different  countries  in  terms  of  economic perfor-
mance  and the structure and the  efficiency of institutions, higher rates  of economic 
growth are positively correlated with the higher quality of institutions. Crucial for a 
well-functioning economy is the efficient mix of state and market, intervention and lais-
sez-faire. Thus, in this concept a successful economic transition that ensures sustainable 
growth is determined by the efficient activities of both the market and the government. 
To wit, from dynamic perspective both have to be capable to produce new effective and 
efficient solutions to existing problems and to transpose them successfully. 
 
While the conditions for the process of generating and imposing of new solutions for the 
market has been broadly examined by economists, the analog process and its driving 
factors  in  developing  of  suitable  economic policies by  the  government  has  recently 
moved into the focus of economic interest. Before moving to the concept of governmen-
tal learning, below we shed light on the crucial factors of the deliberate institutional 
change, such as institutional innovation and political entrepreneurship as well as on the 
phenomenon of institutional incongruity. 
I STITUTIO AL I  OVATIO , POLITICAL E TREPRE EURSHIP A D  
I STITUTIO AL I CO GRUITY 
To explain institutional innovation and political entrepreneurship3 a parallel could be 
drown to Schumpeter’s innovator. Schumpeter emphasized the role of the entrepreneur 
in the creative process of economic development and was explicit about his economic 
function. The entrepreneur distorts the prevailing equilibrium by introducing innova-
tions to the market. He challenges existing structures and, thus, sets economic develop-
ment into motion. Schumpeter divided this process into three stages: invention, innova-
                                                 
3  In the recent literature there could be found different terms and definitions for institutional innova-
tors and their role in institutional change. Van der Steen and Groenewegen (2009) distinguish be-
tween political, institutional and policy entrepreneurship. Others use rather the term institutional en-
trepreneurship (e.g. BECKERT 1999, DORADO 2005) or political entrepreneurship (HEDERER 
2007). This paper uses the term introduced by Dahl (1961). To wit, political entrepreneurs are “indi-
viduals who recombine resources in the policy arena to bring about change” (HENREKSON and 
SANANDAJI 2010, citing DAHL).  
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tion and imitation. Inventor develops new ideas, products or processes, while the inno-
vative entrepreneur moves the economy forward from static equilibrium through com-
mercialization of invention. “Economic leadership in particular must hence be distin-
guished from ‘invention’. As long as they are not carried into practice, inventions are 
economically irrelevant.” (SCHUMPETER 2004: 88-89) The final step in this three-
stage process is imitation. It concerns the more general adoption and diffusion of new 
products or processes that passed the market selection test. To sum up, the entrepreneur 
plays an important role in resolving the problem of the utilization and the spread of 
knowledge which was pointed in his works by Hayek (1937).4 
 
In analogy to economic entrepreneur who is seen as an engine of economic develop-
ment, political entrepreneurs proactively push for new institutions. Carrying into prac-
tice institutional innovations implies adaptation of the original institutional ideas to spe-
cific conditions of exiting institutional environment. Political entrepreneurs are bounded 
in their rationality and act under conditions of radical uncertainty, as defined by Knight 
(1921), since institutional environment is complex and political agents are not omnis-
cient. However, they undertake actions in attempt to leverage resources to transform ex-
isting institutions or to create new ones (e.g. METCALF 1995, WITT 2003). 
 
In practice, political actors pursue an economic policy that forms and transforms an in-
tegrated whole. The  establishment of institutional innovations must be examined by 
conformity with the existing institutional framework. Thus policy making influences 
and  in  the  same  time  co-evolves  with  technological,  cultural  and  institutional 
processes.5 To avoid lock-ins and unfavorable institutional outcome there is a need for a 
selection mechanism. In markets, competition is the primary selection mechanism, be-
cause only an environment of competition allows economic actors to optimally unfold 
their creativity and helps to coordinate it in voluntary decisions. Then, functioning com-
petition promotes efficient allocation and, hence, better economic performance. There is 
a similar mechanism for institutional innovations. Political entrepreneurship creates op-
portunity for political actors to maximize their personal utility. Re-election or conti-
nuous maintenance of power – provided by better living standards of population – could 
be seen as incentives to implement institutional innovations. However, the valuation of 
new  institutions  is  a  more  difficult  task.  As  the  institutional  innovations  are  imple-
mented with the deliberate intention by political entrepreneurs the issue of institutional 
incongruity emerges. The pure implementation of institutional innovations does not en-
sure their functioning, which can be evaluated in terms of the effectiveness and efficien-
cy of the institution (GRUŠEVAJA 2006). 
 
If de facto rules correspond to de jure rules, then an institution is assumed to be effec-
tive. Formal institutional innovations implemented by governmental activities, which 
are not supported by existing informal institutions, would hardly be accepted, and final-
ly do not correspond to the original aims. In other words, such institutional innovations 
are not  effective because of the institutional incongruity. Discrepancies between the 
quick realization of new formal rules and the gradual path-dependent development of 
                                                 
4  Hayek (1937) stressed the importance of the use of knowledge as a main vehicle of the economic 
process. 




informal rules such as traditions and norms of conduct create conflicts between these in-
stitutions. Therefore, the result of a rapid or an extreme institutional change becomes 
hardly predictable. 
 
Institutional efficiency is high if the costs of realization, enforcement and control of in-
stitutions are minimized. However, an inconsistency between formal and informal rules 
would cause high transaction costs. These manifest themselves in such activities as lob-
bying, the formation of power clusters, increasing corruption, wasting of time and fi-
nancial expenditures to reduce uncertainty. The bigger the discrepancies in the institu-
tional development, the higher are the transaction costs and their negative influence on 
economic performance. Thus, the inconsistency of the institutional environment inhibits 
economic growth. As formal institutions are set up by the government, then governmen-
tal learning becomes important as a means of reducing institutional inconsistency. 
THE ROLE OF GOVER ME T A D GOVER ME TAL LEAR I G 
In mainstream economics, government intervention is needed only in the case of market 
failure (such as collective goods, externalities and natural monopolies) or for macroeco-
nomic regulations (such as financial and fiscal systems, employment etc.). Institutional 
economics goes a step further. It argues that governmental activities should be extended 
to the creation of a stable institutional environment, including clearly defined property 
rights, competition and industrial policy as well as transparent information structure. In 
addition, the government is obligated to create markets where they do not emerge be-
cause of high sunk costs or transaction costs (costs of information, negotiation, contract 
enforcement and the like). Political actors have the privilege of creating or changing 
formal institutions and enforcing them in order to direct the behavior of private actors 
toward the desired outcome (higher economic efficiency, better economic performance). 
However,  new  institutionalists  would  recommend  carefully,  sparing  intervention  in 
market activities as the costs of government failure might be higher due to principal-
agent problems than the benefits from the correction of markets that failed (JENSEN 
1983). 
 
The  evolutionary  approach  to  institutions  as  the  further  development  of  OIE  would 
agree on the problems caused by information asymmetries, however, from a different 
perspective.  Governments,  evolutionary  institutionalists  would  argue,  are  not  only 
bounded  in  rationality;  the  actors  also  face  radical  uncertainty  (HODGSON  1999). 
Moreover, the processes of cultural, social, technological and economic development 
are ongoing and interrelated. Thus, rationality is contingent and procedural. Individual 
behavior is directed toward needs satisfaction instead of outcome maximization. There 
is no aimed equilibrium, so the government does not correct the failure of the markets 
but rather guides and facilitates institutional and economic processes in socially desira-
ble directions. “Such a government is also aware of possibilities of the necessity to ex-
plore and to learn, and of the necessity to create opportunities” (GROENEWEGEN, 
STEEN 2007: 352). Taking into account the assumption of the bounded rationality and 
of the radical uncertainty of a situation in which political actors make their decisions, 
the government should be a learning actor. Knowledge, experience and learning become 
important elements in decision-making. Institutionalists representing this approach con-
clude that the state should "foster learning, enhance human capabilities, systematically 
incorporate  growing  knowledge  and  adapt  to  changing  circumstances"  (HODGSON  
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1999). Others add that the government should allow for experimentation (HODGSON 
1999:  248,  262;  GROENEWEGEN,  KUNNEKE  2005)  and  create  variety 
(MATCALFE 1995). 
 
As a model “governmental learning” consists of human action and opportunity discov-
ery (political entrepreneurship), learning, revision of plans and error elimination. Based 
on this picture, three types of governmental learning are distinguished by Groenewe-
gen/Steen (2007): 1) “normal” policy learning, 2) re-description and “direct” Learning, 
as well as 3) innovative policy learning. 
1)  "Normal" policy learning (DENZAU, NORTH 1994) is allowed under a condi-
tion of stability for governments in developed industrial countries with a well-
defined framework, within a consistent institutional environment where shared 
mental maps of the involved actors are clear and stable and congruent with for-
mal institutions and institutional arrangements. The relationships between the 
government and other actors are based on trust and continuous interactions be-
tween them. The learning process is directed toward improvements in the exist-
ing framework through incremental changes. “Imitation, experimentation, and 
trial and error are all possible within the existing policy trajectory, but without 
disturbing its basic features; in other words, a novelty is absorbed and molded so 
it  fits  well  in  the  system  and  can  contribute  to  further  perfection” 
(GROENEWEGEN, STEEN 2007: 356). 
2)  With re-description and "direct" learning, the government can "re-describe" the 
institutional foundation as discussed in North’s (2005) work. New mental maps 
and new ways of thinking facilitate the process directed toward a new institu-
tional environment through institutional innovations. A necessary condition is 
economic or/and political pressure to radically change the institutional frame-
work. The trigger of the process would be a crisis or a strategic decision during 
steady development. The outcome depends strongly on the will to invest in the 
new “logic” showed by political and institutional entrepreneurs as well as their 
capacity  for  “collective  action.”  In  addition,  structural  changes  should  avoid 
strong institutional inconsistencies through a careful balanced implementation of 
institutional innovations and mutual change/adaptation of shared mental maps 
(NOOTEBOOM 2000). In terms of informal institutions, the clear demonstra-
tion and communication of the benefits the change brings to actors help facilitate 
a smooth adaptation. 
3)  The third type of learning – innovative policy learning – takes place within a 
flexible institutional framework that is open to innovation and aims to produce 
institutional variety. The policymaker is rather more of a creative political entre-
preneur than a technocrat and possesses particular knowledge and learning capa-
bility. This type of learning requires a special type of government that is innova-
tive and willing to learn actively within its own structure and with other actors. 
Such a government should, on one hand, create a stimulus for experiments out-
side existing structures and, on the other hand, develop “‘neutral’ selection me-
chanisms  to  avoid  lock-ins  and  the  dominance  of  interest  groups” 





The transition process from planned to market economy as a radical determined change 
in institutional environment implies opportunities for the two last types of governmental 
learning. In this context the institutional innovation through political entrepreneurship – 
implemented by technocrat or creative political entrepreneur – becomes a driving me-
chanism of the comprehensive deliberate institutional change. 
To illustrate the significant impact of governmental learning on the consistency of insti-
tutional change and hence on economic performance, the transition processes in China 
and Russia are very briefly surveyed. 
THE TRA SITIO  PROCESS I  CHI A   
The Chinese transition process started after the great economic experiment by Mao Ze-
dong, the Great Leap Forward (1958-1960), and the ensuing radical political movement, 
the Cultural Revolution (1967-1976), brought starvation, violence and economic disas-
ter to the country. Both experiments aimed at establishing a new socio-economic and 
political system close to a socialist regime by deinstalling the institution of the family 
by imposing a communal property rights system, and both failed completely. The eco-
nomic  disaster  forced  the  ruling  party  to  learn  from  this  experience  and  initiated 
changes in policies. The transition process in China started in 1978 with the announce-
ment of a new program for economic development under the slogan of a “Chinese-style 
socialist market system” (YU 2007: 8-11) that included the following: 1) a move from 
the collectivized agricultural system to a more anatomic system (private peasant plots); 
2) the reduction of centralized economic planning, passing responsibility for acquisition 
of input and output products and materials to local economic units; 3) encouragement of 
technological development; and 4) the creation of experimental zones for joint ventures 
with the aim of attracting foreign capital for economic modernization. The transition 
process was characterized by gradual learning and experimentation in the different areas 
of economic life. The most significant experiments at that time were the agricultural re-
sponsibility system, the creation of specific economic zones and, beginning in 1983, the 
“dual track” pricing system in state-owned industries (YU 2007: 8-11, RAISER 1994: 2-
7). 
 
The household responsibility system (HRS) in agriculture was introduced in 1978 when 
the land was still owned communally. The new system permitted households to lease 
land on a contractual basis for a certain period of time. In 1988, the right to transfer usu-
fruct  land  was  introduced,  which  could  be  considered  a  derivate  of  property  rights 
(BELL, KOCHHAR 1992). The core of the new system was the permission to dispose 
freely of residual output after households had made their contributions to the communi-
ties’ supply quota and deducted collective services and agricultural taxes. This reform 
brought “dramatic improvements in agricultural productivity and rising real incomes in 
rural  areas  led  to  a  surge  in  output  of  township  and  village  enterprises  (TVEs)” 
(RAISER 1994: 2). 
 
The creation of four specific economic zones (SEZs) in Guangdong and Fujian provinc-
es was aimed to increase autonomy in various state-owned organizations on a selective 
basis as well as to attract foreign capital for modernization (HUSSAIN 1990). Those 
experimental zones were designed to tackle uncertainty in a sensible way. Due to the 
economic disaster caused by the Great Leap Forward, the government tried to confine 
economic experiments to a small region to avoid failure spreading to the entire nation. If  
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the experiment was successful, the experience could be applied to other regions. The 
strategy proved to be appropriate as, at the first stage of the experiment, the outcome did 
not seem promising. The original goals, such as an increase in export production, have 
not been fulfilled. Foreign investors spent their money building factories to take advan-
tage of the large supply of cheap labor and to produce goods for the huge Chinese mar-
ket rather than for exports. In addition, the impact of foreign direct investments on the 
modernization of the Chinese economy was quite low as “foreigners were unwilling to 
invest their money in expensive high-tech capital that a largely unskilled labor force 
might not be able to use” (YU 2007: 12). It took decision-makers almost 20 years of tri-
al and error—making changes in the tax structure, correcting measures for controlling 
corruption, investing in education and workers to create a skilled workforce—to make 
this economic experiment successful. 
 
The last of the three most significant economic experiments was the introduction of the 
“dual track” pricing system for state-owned enterprises (SOE) in 1983. The central gov-
ernment set the plan for a nominal quota for fixed price deliveries while regional gov-
ernments issued price guidelines for transactions with state purchasing agencies. The re-
sidual output could be sold on the free market. Later on, direct (profit) and indirect 
(turnover) taxation replaced profit transfer from SOEs to the central government. Since 
1986, the contract responsibility system (CRS) has permitted enterprises to negotiate 
fixed supply quotas and tax obligations. Additional earnings could be retained. Further 
reforms in the industrial sector, for example, increased autonomy in the financing of in-
vestment given to SOEs, have boosted the development of China’s capital market and 
financial sector (RAISER 1994: 4). 
 
To sum up, the government reformed the Chinese economy on the mainland without 
following any model but by an incremental process of trial and error. This gradual ap-
proach to transforming the economy had one significant advantage. Chinese citizens 
could partially retain their old shared mental models while slowly transforming them 
through learning new ways of doing. The new policies introduced step-by-step in differ-
ent segments of the economy served as small impulses to the people’s thinking and 
doing. In this way, a new framework evolved as a result of the learning processes, in-
cluding  experiments,  failed  plans,  corrections,  adjustments  and  innovations.  Starting 
with successful reforms in the rural sector, similar reforms were expanded to the indus-
trial sector and later to the financial sector (CHEUNG 1998). The government and Chi-
nese citizens, even the most conservative, participated in this process, slowly giving up 
communist ideology and becoming involved in market processes. “A new social stock 
of knowledge has been steadily built up as these activities are extended to the whole 
economy” (YU 2007: 11). The Chinese transition approach, which included steady go-
vernmental learning, avoided big inconsistencies between formal and informal institu-
tions, and the economic performance of the Chinese economy remained high over the 
entire transition period. 
 
With the view to our model of “governmental learning” it could be concluded that the 
Chinise political elite succeded to provide of at least one condition essential to every of 
the three types of governmental learning. First, the condition of stability for government 
allowed to maintain trust of actors and to establish the basis for learning processes. 




moving towards “new” logic and mental models. The Chinese political elite revealed 
the strong will to invest into the re-describtion of the institutional foundation. And last, 
the government afforded to institutional entrepreneurs and to economic actors an oppor-
tunity for partial and mutual institutional innovations whereas it maintained the control 
and pursued its respective interests defined in terms of power. Overall, the imphasis in 
Chinese transformation process was put on a careful and balanced implementation of 
the new institutional features.  
TRA SITIO  PROCESS I  RUSSIA 
As the process of transition in Russia began at the end of 1989, there were as in China 
no elaborated theories about what had to be done to accomplish the transition process 
successfully with a free market economy established. Two strategies were discussed and 
then applied consecutively by leading economists. The first, the ordoliberal approach 
(Austrian school), focused on the key institutional principles of a free market economy 
and recommended a gradual simultaneous creation of an institutional framework in the 
first place. The second, based on  eoclassical theory, proposed a radical change process 
(known as the “Big-Bang” transition strategy) involving the immediate destruction of 
old institutions and a rapid conversion to free market arrangements. In particular, the 
ordoliberal approach propounded already in the 1989 reforms with an emphasis on the 
setting up of an institutional framework of the free market economy, however without 
giving any advice about the sequence of reforms. The result was a collapse of produc-
tion structures and a decline in the social product. Thus, in the early 1990s, most leading 
economists in their advisory capacities assumed that a speedy change of the system 
from a centrally managed economy to a free market economy would be possible and 
would be a better transition strategy. Therefore, they tried to speed up the transition 
through the introduction of institutions most significant (in their opinion) to the free 
market economy, such as a financial system, private property etc. In hindsight, the me-
thod did not prove to be very successful either as Russia’s market economy is still very 
vulnerable to external shocks. On a deeper analysis, it is evident that both of the transi-
tion approaches focused on a static institutional result and answered the question which 
institutions need to be implemented. However, the question is who and how to design 
and establish institutions that can fulfill the aims. At this point, governmental learning 
as a dynamic process becomes one of the most significant determinants of the economic 
development and economic performance of a country. 
 
Russia,  which  followed  the  same  method  of  transition  as  other  formerly  socialistic 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe, had more difficulties finding an appropriate 
transition strategy. The inconsistency between rapidly introduced new formal and exist-
ing informal institutions was here essentially stronger manifested than in the other coun-
tries of the Eastern bloc. The more than 60 years of socialist regime have very strongly 
influenced the country and the social actors. The absence of a legal culture (rule of law) 
and therefore the lack of familiarity with the new rules recommended by foreign experts 
immensely increased individual uncertainty and intensified the inconsistency of the in-
stitutional development, since the old “shared mental maps” were incompatible with the 
new formal institutions. Therefore, the adaptation process was impeded considerably. 
The political actors acted under conditions of radical uncertainty, bounded rationality 
and immense pressure from inside and outside the country to bring rapid changes under 
way. The political actors were not able—cognitively and organizationally—to experi- 
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ment, to develop alternatives, to correct failed plans step-by-step. Pace and complexity 
of the transition overloaded the learning capacity of the decision-makers and made a 
clear transition strategy impractical, which led to the economic chaos and strong decline 
in growth in the first years of the transition. 
 
Following to our model of “governmental learning” the Russian political elite did not 
succeded to establish sufficient conditions for effective governmental learning in terms 
of  economic  development.  Its  approach  approximates  to  the  second  type  “the  re-
description and “direct” governmental learning”. Despite the economic pressure to radi-
cally change the institutional framework and the strong will of the new political elite to 
invest in the new “logic” the Russian government failed in its capacity for a careful ba-
lanced implementation of new institutional framework.This constituted in low adminis-
tration capacity, potential political instability and the strong influence of small interest 
groups  (e.g.  oligarchs).  Hence,  governmetal  learning  became  a  not  “cost-efficient” 
process. 
GOVER ME TAL LEAR I G A D TRA SACTIO  COSTS 
The fast pace of transition, an ineffective and inflexible economic structure, unfamiliar 
new governance principles — for all these reasons, the political actors in Russia faced 
challenges  and  cognitive  overload,  which  in  general  negatively  affect  the  learning 
process. Governmental learning was impeded by the different strategy suggestions of 
leading experts, on one hand, and the loss of trust by the population, on the other hand. 
The decision-makers acted within political and economic disorder. The political econo-
my explains the behavior of the political actors as guided by their personal goals and in-
fluenced by interest groups or so-called vested interests (DOWNS 1957, OLSON 1965). 
Thus, the direction and quality of institutional change depend on what kind of influence 
is more prevalent in the society. The economic transition process, which is generally 
characterized by the radical uncertainty and bounded rationality of social actors, put 
high challenges on the actors involved in decision-making. Institutional change con-
ducted overnight does not produce an institutional tabula rasa and cannot be considered 
a  process  of  “creative  destruction”  if  informal  institutions,  including  shared  mental 
maps, continue to influence the decision-making process and produce, through inconsis-
tencies between new formal and old informal institutions, high transaction costs.6 
 
The first reason for high transaction costs is explained by the theory of public choice. 
Every development of new rules in a community will always be influenced by the old 
                                                 
6  Strong inconsistence in the institutional development leads to problems of the acceptance and, thus, 
of the enforcement of the new formal rules. With a rise of inconsistence grow also transaction costs 
(i.e. costs of information, learning, enforcement and not at least costs of control). As pointed by Pis-
tor et al. (2000), an important role plays familiarity with new rules in the society. The familiarity 
with the new implemented rules could be expected in cases, if a country in its recent history was al-
ready confronted with institutions of the same legal family or with a similar set of rules. Here, the 
so-called “cultural border” could play a central role. Berkowitz et al. (2003) also confirms that the 
effectiveness of the newly enforced institutions in a country is higher, if it was once in its history 
familiar with basic principles of such institutions. In such case, the social actors can better under-
stand the means of the rules and, therefore, to make better use of them. This explains the reason for 





rules of conduct and by the social groups profiting off these rules. Thus, it is almost in-
evitable that through the change the underprivileged would benefit, and therefore, the 
change-rejecting groups would try to protect their interests through the formation of 
lobbying groups and rent-seeking behavior. Change-rejecting individuals are willing to 
pay more in order to maintain the old framework. They could build a representative 
lobby or a political party to secure the advantages of their particular positions. The dif-
ferent institutions (the old ones and the new ones) will not only coexist but also compete 
with each other (STREIT, MUMMERT 1996: 14-18). If the adaption of formal and in-
formal institutions to each other could succeed within the development processes, then 
the rules’ disconformities might be reduced. Therefore, a more consistent institutional 
environment lowers transaction costs and positively affects economic performance by 
encouraging economic entrepreneurship through the stabilization of expectations. 
 
The second reason for high transaction costs is explained by the radical uncertainty that 
accompanies  the  process  of  transition  as  fast  deliberated  institutional  change.  With 
strong discrepancies between old and new rules, uncertainty as well as the costs to re-
duce it would expand (NORTH 1990: 30). In countries such as China, where the change 
in formal institutions occurs in better agreement with the development of informal insti-
tutions, transaction costs were lower, and the acceptance of changes by individuals was 
higher (STREIT, MUMMERT 1996: 6). Therefore, the economic performance has also 
been positively  influenced.  If  such  an  agreement  is  attainable by  political/economic 
means, then the transition will precede more smoothly, without strong internal shocks as 
social and economic disorder. However, the biggest problem is that informal institutions 
and especially “shared mental maps” are only slowly moldable. North (1992: 12) stated 
that “informal constraints, unlike formal rules cannot be changed overnight”. 
 
Overall, high transaction costs negatively influence economic performance. Frequent 
changes in plans and strategies also increase uncertainty and are costly. Failed strategies 
applied to the entire economy cause economic disorientation. Error elimination becomes 
a difficult task as there are always groups or individuals involved that benefit from cer-
tain reforms and hence are reluctant to accept corrections. Without clear strategic orien-
tations, with a lack of public control and through cognitive overload, decision-makers 
tend toward rent-seeking behavior as personal goals are well defined. All of these com-
ponents — high transaction costs caused by inconsistency in institutional change, error 
elimination in large dimensions, rent-seeking behavior — impede or reduce economic 
performance.  
WHY WAS GOVER ME TAL LEAR I G EFFECTIVE I  CHI A A D 
 OT I  RUSSIA? 
The differences in the progress of the transition process of the two countries and the im-
pact of reforms on the economic performance are obvious. The intriguing question is 
why governmental learning was effective in China and not in Russia. 
 
The first reason involves the different initial economic and political conditions in the re-
spective countries. Before the first reforms were introduced, China revealed high rates 
of economic growth while Russia was mired in stagnation. In China, single political ac-
tors have fallen into disrepute though the political system as whole did not discredit it-
self for the broad population. Thus, trust in the governance principles of the system and  
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the capability of the new political leaders to make appropriate decisions was sustained. 
In Russia, indeed economic and political systems were both tremendously decried. Trust 
in the correct political choice or decision-making was eroded. Rapid changes were, on 
one hand, desperately required, and on the other hand, the population considered the 
moves toward a capitalist method of doing suspect as it was contrary to the prevailing 
ideology or basically unknown. Under such circumstances, governmental learning was 
impeded by mistrust.  
 
The  second  reason  concerns  the  informal  institutional  environment.  “Shared  mental 
maps” or informal institutions were used in China to support reforms that introduced in-
cremental change in accordance with the process of the transition whereas in Russia in-
formal institutions were shown to be incongruent with the new capitalist way of doing 
and  thinking.  Following  the  recommendations  of  foreign  advisers  without  a  steady 
adaptation of the “shared mental maps” increased the inconsistency of institutional de-
velopment and thus the transaction costs of the transition process. Public policymakers 
were constantly engaged in solving problems without an appropriate stock of know-
ledge. In China, they could unlearn and learn through gradual experimentation and error 
elimination, slowly changing the way of thinking. In Russia, the decision-makers were 
overwhelmed with the novelty and huge range of ill-specified problems that the deci-
sion-makers tried to solve by relying on their own old stock of knowledge or foreign 
experts. Under such conditions, the learning process is less effective because, due to in-
terdependencies in the economy, the outcomes of an experiment or an institutional in-
novation are less observable and clearly confined. 
 
The third reason is the pace of transition. Gradual changes are incremental and corres-
pond to the human cognitive ability to acquire and to convert information. Any learning 
process requires time to develop innovations, to experiment, to adapt or to change pre-
vious plans, to eliminate errors and to search for alternatives. A rapidly changing insti-
tutional environment increases 1) learning costs through higher error probability and 2) 
transaction costs caused by error elimination. The slow pace of the reform process in 
China facilitated governmental learning. Hence, public choice and the activities of po-
werful interest groups both worked toward new institutions that promote high growth. 
In Russia, the rapid exchange of an entire formal institutional framework inhibited go-
vernmental learning and led to a strong decline in growth for a long period. 
SUMMARY 
Mainstream studies in economic development are not lacking. However, the mainstream 
approach assumes omnipotent public policymakers who have perfect knowledge and 
governments that are error free. In addition, uncertainty is treated in a static sense, and 
hence learning means simple optimization with given known options. In the real world, 
the outcome of activities is not exactly predictable, and decision-makers face cognitive 
challenges through novelty, creativity and experimentation. How much decision-makers 
succeed in learning and unlearning determines or at least significantly affects the eco-
nomic performance of a country. These elements are largely missing in mainstream 
economic analysis. This paper emphasizes the role of dynamic governmental learning 
under the conditions of bounded rationality and radical uncertainty that are the main 




that the sustained growth in China and the strong decline in growth in Russia are deter-
mined by the capability and opportunity for effective governmental learning. 
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